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Abstract
Geoengineering, i.e. the use of artificial techniques aiming at cooling the planet, is increasingly considered as a
realistic alternative to emission mitigation. Several methods are promising for their capacity to quickly halt global
warming at a moderate cost. Such cheap technologies might be very beneficial to countries profoundly affected by
global warming. In this paper, I propose a dynamic model in which geoengineering is introduced as an alternative to
mitigation. Contrary to abatement, geoengineering is fast and cheap, but requires a large initial investment in research
and development. Within this framework, I confirm the fear which is common among geoengineering opponents:
abatement is reduced if geoengineering is expected to be available in the future. The long-run implications of the
model are also alarming as geoengineering will not be undertaken progressively. The sudden implementation of
geoengineering, together with the sharp jump in temperature induced, may disturb climate equilibrium and fragile
ecosystems. Furthermore, the availability of geoengineering will exacerbate intergenerational issues: while current
generations will anticipate the use of geoengineering by increasing their emissions, future generations will have to
reduce their emissions, to bear the cost of sustaining geoengineering for centuries and to suffer from its negative
side-effects.
Keywords: Geoengineering, Abatement, Climate change, Global warming, R&D, Intergenerational issues
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1. Introduction
The Earth system is continuously heated by the short-
wave light coming from the Sun. Before reaching the
Earth surface, a fraction of this short-wave radiation, the
albedo, is reflected by clouds and white surfaces. The
rest, about two-thirds of the incident solar radiation, is
absorbed by the Earth system and converted into heat.
This heat is then re-emitted from the Earth surface as
long-wave radiation. In equilibrium, the energy com-
ing from the sun and absorbed by the Earth surface is
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exactly compensated by the heat that escapes the Earth
system. This delicate energy balance determines Earth
temperature: if the radiation stream is perturbed by 1%,
the surface temperature would change by about 1.8◦C.
The increase in the atmospheric concentration of
greenhouse gases (GHGs), principally carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane and water vapor, affects this fragile
equilibrium. Indeed, while GHGs allow the passage of
the short-wave radiation (the sunlight and the albedo),
they absorb and re-emit a fraction of the long-wave radi-
ation (heat) escaping from the Earth. Part of this energy
is sent back in direction of the Earth surface and again
converted into heat. This back-and-forth of long-wave
radiation, commonly called “greenhouse effect”, is seen
as the main responsible for global warming.
Indeed, because of the industrial revolution, the at-
mospheric concentration of CO2 increased over the past
two centuries from 280 ppmv (parts per million by vol-
ume) in preindustrial time to 379 ppmv in 2005 (+40%)
October 17, 2011
(IPCC Working Group I, 2007). Annual emission of
carbon dioxide was increased by 80% between 1970
and 2004. With such a trend, atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration is projected to range from 540 to 970 ppmv by
the end of the 21st century. Similarly, methane concen-
tration is nowadays over 150% above its preindustrial
level. Changes in atmospheric concentration of green-
house gases have already risen the surface Earth’s tem-
perature of 0.8◦C. Even if the concentration of green-
house gases remains stable, the average temperature is
still expected to rise of one more degree (IPCC Work-
ing Group I, 2007). This is due to the time lag in
global warming caused by the large heat capacity of the
oceans. The IPCC anticipates a global warming rang-
ing between 1.8 and 4◦C, leading to the collapse of the
major ice sheets and a sea level rise of tens of meters
(IPCC Working Group II, 2007). Even more frighten-
ing is the likelihood of unpredictable non-linearities in
climate change, or “tipping points”, at which tempera-
ture, or other factors, may rapidly generate irreversible
and potentially very destructive changes (IPCC Work-
ing Group II, 2007; Swart and Marinova, 2010; Kousky
et al., 2009).
In order to prevent such dangerous and irreversible
consequences, the most popular approach, mitigation,
seeks to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. Despite the last twenty years of proac-
tive diplomatic talks, this strategy seems limited be-
cause subject to free-riding. The stabilization of CO2
concentration would require a 60–80% worldwide re-
duction in current anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Nev-
ertheless, fossil fuels provide over 80% of the world’s
energy, and emissions of CO2 are actually increasing
by around 2% each year (Crutzen, 2006). Many gov-
ernments are reluctant to engage in unpopular binding
commitments whose cost is born in the short-run, while
benefits mainly arise in the long-run.
In response to this coordination failure, geoengineer-
ing has been put forward in the scientific debate as
a credible but controversial alternative to mitigation2.
Geoengineering is defined by the National Academy
of Sciences (1992) as the “options that would involve
large-scale engineering of our environment in order to
combat or counteract the effects of changes in atmo-
spheric chemistry”. Geoengineering techniques may be
2A third approach, adaptation, proposes to render the society and
the environment more robust to the changes in climate that are occur-
ring. The evaluation of this third solution is beyond the scope of this
paper.
classified in two categories, depending on whether they
aim at reducing the greenhouse effect, or at diminish-
ing the share of sunlight that reaches and warms the
Earth system. On the one hand, carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) seek to remove CO2 from the atmosphere in or-
der to reduce the amount of long-wave radiation trapped
in the Earth system through the greenhouse effect. For
example, the literature proposes to extend the surface
of the Earth covered by trees, to increase the oceanic
uptake of CO2 through enhanced algae and plankton
growth, to accelerate artificially the mineral sequestra-
tion of CO2, or to create “artificial trees” that capture
CO2 thanks to a chemical sorbent.
On the other hand, solar radiation management
(SRM) aims at repelling short-wave sunlight before the
radiation hits the Earth surface and turns into heat. Off-
setting the warming caused by a doubling of the pre-
industrial revolution atmospheric concentration of CO2
would require shielding or reflecting approximately
1.8% of the incident solar radiation. The two most ef-
fective methods are the injection of reflective particles,
principally sulfate aerosols, in the high-atmosphere
(Crutzen, 2006), and the increase of the albedo of mar-
itime areas by seeding and whitening stratocumulus
clouds over the oceans (Salter et al., 2008; Latham et al.,
2008). Recently, these two geoengineering techniques
were evaluated using modified DICE models (Nord-
haus, 2007; Bickel, 2009; Goes et al., 2009; Bickel and
Agrawal, 2011). All but Goes et al. (2009) conclude that
geoengineering is highly cost-effective. For example,
Bickel (2009) estimates benefit-cost ratios of around
25 to 1 for aerosols injection in the stratosphere and
around 5000 to 1 for cloud albedo enhancement. The
study of Goes et al. (2009) is at odds with these conclu-
sions. Rather, they argue that aerosol geoengineering
is not cost-effective because too risky in case of fail-
ure to sustain aerosol injections. Another SRM method
would be to launch space sunshields between the sun
and the Earth to block incoming radiations. Proposals
have also been made to increase Earth albedo by bright-
ening land or ocean surfaces, for example by painting
roofs or covering deserts with reflective sheets. These
last two options appear to be less cost-effective than the
injection of sulfate aerosols in the high-atmosphere or
the enhancement of cloud albedo (see Shepherd (2009)
for a detailed review of all geoengineering methods).
This paper aims at comparing mitigation (abatement)
and geoengineering. More specifically, I will construct
a theoretical model assessing under which conditions
geoengineering may be used as cheap substitute for
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abatement. As both mitigation and carbon management
seek to reduce the quantity of CO2 in the atmosphere,
these two methods would be formalized in the same
way. CDR can be regarded as special kind of mitiga-
tion method. Therefore, I focus only on SRM whose
formalization and properties are sharply different from
abatement. In what follows, I use the term geoengineer-
ing to refer to SRM.
I distinguish seven differences between geoengineer-
ing and abatement. First, while it would be techni-
cally feasible to drastically decrease emissions nowa-
days, geoengineering is not yet implementable and re-
quires a sustained effort in research and development.
Second, geoengineering is cheaper than abatement, but
requires large investments in research and development.
Third, geoengineering may act much faster than abate-
ment. Indeed, abatement requires a sustained effort to
mitigate emissions. Furthermore, because GHGs is a
stock accumulating over time, and because the large
heat capacity of the oceans induces a time lag in global
warming, the positive impact of mitigating emissions is
only expected in the long-run. Conversely, geoengineer-
ing is fast at decreasing the average temperature when
it is implemented. Fourth, contrary to abatement, geo-
engineering does not fight the cause of global warm-
ing. Rather, it aims at artificially offsetting the green-
house effect in order to prevent its detrimental conse-
quences. Fifth, geoengineering is imperfect as it may
have large side-effects on the environment. For ex-
ample, stratospheric sulfate injection may have harm-
ful consequences on stratospheric ozone and biologi-
cal productivity. Cloud albedo enhancement may affect
weather patterns and ocean currents. Both these meth-
ods have non-uniform effects, and induce significant re-
gional climate changes (Jones et al., 2011). The sixth
difference between geoengineering and abatement is re-
lated to their surrounding uncertainties. For geoengi-
neering, the uncertainty is related to the cost, the effec-
tiveness and the presence of possible side-effects. Con-
versely, for mitigation, the amount of abatement needed
to avoid harmful consequences and “tipping points” is
unknown. Finally, while countries implementing geo-
engineering may be clearly identified, it is much harder
to assess which country has to mitigate its emissions,
and by how much. Consequently, a country deciding
unilaterally to use geoengineering may be punished by
others. This is not the case for countries emitting more
GHGs.
The literature on the economics of geoengineering is
scarce. Barrett (2007) was the first economist to discuss
governance challenges brought about by geoengineer-
ing. He argues that any countries for which implemen-
tation costs are lower than benefits will be willing to try
it. As Barrett (2007) does not propose a formal model,
he can not predict which country or group of countries
will bear the cost. Only four papers introduced geo-
engineering in economic models as a cheap alternative
to abatement. First, using a one-country model with cli-
mate damages, Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) con-
clude that geoengineering is an imperfect substitute for
abatement as it generates negative side-effects (fourth
and fifth differences). Second, by using numerical es-
timations, Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009) expand this
framework to allow for uncertainty on the effectiveness
and the consequences of geoengineering (sixth differ-
ence). They show that geoengineering is an effective
means to approach the uncertainty on climate damages
as it can be implemented quickly if the bad outcome
of the uncertainty is revealed. Finally, Moreno-Cruz
(2009) and Millard-Ball (2011) show that countries act
strategically when geoengineering is made available in a
multi-country framework (Seventh difference). For ex-
ample, Moreno-Cruz (2009) shows that a country may
substitute away from abatement to induce higher levels
of geoengineering in other countries. Conversely, if a
country fears the side-effects of geoengineering, it may
increase its level of abatement to deter the use of geo-
engineering by other countries. Similarly, Millard-Ball
(2011) shows that countries not much affected by cli-
mate change may nevertheless strengthen their level of
abatement to avoid the threat of unilateral geoengineer-
ing use coming from a country highly affected by global
warming.
For now, the theoretical literature on geoengineering
disregarded the three first differences between abate-
ment and geoengineering. Introducing these in a the-
oretical framework is the main objective of the paper.
I will construct a dynamic model that takes into ac-
count both the fastness and the specific cost structure
of geoengineering. More specifically, geoengineering
will be introduced besides abatement in a two-period
model with climate damages. Geoengineering will be
characterized by a fixed cost which includes both re-
search and development investments as well as indirect
costs related to governance issues or conflict mitiga-
tion. While geoengineering may quickly reduce temper-
ature and climate damages, abatement is much slower
as emissions accumulate as a stock. Within this frame-
work, I will study the short- and the long-run implica-
tions of geoengineering availability, with a special focus
on intergenerational issues. Some crucial differences
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with Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) will be high-
lighted along the way.
In the next section, I introduce the two-period model,
in which both abatement and geoengineering may be
undertaken to prevent climate change damages. In sec-
tion 3, I assess the long-run implications of the model
and I discuss the main findings of the paper. Section 4
concludes.
2. A model of climate change and geoengineering
2.1. Set-up
We consider the maximization problem of a unique
country that seeks to maximize consumption over two
periods. In order to produce one unique good, the coun-
try uses energy et. One unit of energy costs pi, and gen-
erates one unit of GHG emission (later, et will refer for
energy use as well as emissions at time t).
The accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmo-
sphere damages the environment through global warm-
ing. In order to avoid dramatic loss of production due
to the temperature increase, the country may choose to
reduce its emissions (mitigation or abatement) or to im-
plement geoengineering. Both strategies are costly. On
the one hand, by limiting emissions, abatement con-
strains production. On the other hand, implementing
geoengineering requires a large initial investment in the
research and the development of the cooling technology
as well as a sustained effort for maintaining temperature
at the desired level.
At each period, the consumption is equal to the pro-
duction f (et), minus the energy cost piet, the damages
due to global warming Ω(Tt), and the geoengineering
cost Γ(Gt).
ct = f (et) − piet −Ω(Tt) − Γ(Gt).
Formally, we assume that the production function of
the country is quadratic and given by:
f (et) = et(α − βet).
We assume that α > pi to ensure the existence of a pos-
itive solution for et in the “no damage case” ( f
′ > 0,
f ′′ < 0, f (0) = 0).
The evolution of the stock of GHG in the atmosphere,
Pt+1, is determined by the sum of current emissions and
the remaining stock of pollution:
Pt+1 = Pt(1 − δ) + et. (1)
The factor δ is constant and represents the length of life
of CO2 in the atmosphere (0 ≤ δ < 1). Current emis-
sions only have an impact in the next period. This spec-
ification reflects the time lag in global warming.
The world temperature Tt at time t is positively re-
lated to the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
Pt and negatively related to the total quantity of geo-
engineering used Gt. We assume a linear specification:
Tt = Φ(Pt,Gt) = Pt − κGt. (2)
It is worth noting that pollution Pt is a stock. Hence,
emissions have a long-lasting impact on temperature.
Conversely, the quantity of geoengineering Gt is a
flow. At each period, geoengineering has to be re-
implemented if it is optimal to cool the planet.
The global temperature Tt affects the economy
through the damage function Ω(Tt). We assume a
quadratic form for the damage function:
Ω(Tt) = (Tt − γ)
2.
The damage function is positive, strictly convex and U-
shaped with a minimum in γ. This minimum is called
the optimal temperature.
Geoengineering is costly. Contrary to the existing lit-
erature, we assume that the geoengineering cost func-
tion Γ(Gt) is not continuous near Γ(0) = 0 because of
the existence of a fixed cost p. This fixed cost repre-
sents the large investment in R&D and infrastructure
needed to put geoengineering technologies into service.
For Gt > 0, we assume that the cost function of geo-
engineering is linear:
Γ(Gt) =
{
0 if Gt = 0
mGt + p if Gt > 0
In summary, the objective of the country is to maxi-
mize the discounted sum of consumption flows:
max
e1,e2,G1,G2
V(e1, e2,G1,G2) = c1(e1,G1) + ρc2(e1, e2,G2)
=
∑
t=1,2
ρt−1[et(α − βet) − piet − (Pt − κGt − γ)
2
− Γ(Gt)].
The decision variables are the energy consumed and the
geoengineering levels at each period of time (e1, e2, G1,
G2). The stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
at time t = 1, P1 ≥ 0 is given.
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2.2. Solution without climate damages
In order to define abatement, we consider the bench-
mark case of an economy which does not suffer from
global warming (Ω(Tt) = 0). The problem is then
static. The consumption of energy is chosen such that
the marginal benefit of energy equals its marginal cost:
f ′(et) = α − 2βet = pi ⇔ e
∗ =
α − pi
2β
. (3)
The solution, denoted e∗, is constant, unique and pos-
itive as α > pi. Figure 1 shows the graphical solution
of the maximization. In the lower-part of the figure, the
green line represents the production function, and the
red line the energy cost. The marginal counterparts of
these functions are drawn in the upper-part. The opti-
mal use of energy is defined by the equality between the
marginal productivity of energy (the green line) and its
marginal cost (the red line).
Contrary to the existing literature (Moreno-Cruz and
Keith, 2009; Moreno-Cruz, 2009; Moreno-Cruz and
Smulders, 2010), emissions are explictly considered in
this model, and abatement is only an indirect decision
variable. This difference makes possible the dynamic
analysis of geoengineering and climate change. We de-
fine abatement At, as the optimal level of emission with-
out climate damages, e∗, minus the emission level at
time t, et: At = e
∗
− et.
2.3. With geoengineering
The problem is dynamic as present emissions have
an impact on both present production and future dam-
ages. In order to prevent damages from climate change,
the country may mitigate its emissions or invest in geo-
engineering. The country chooses e1, e2, G1 and G2 to
maximize the discounted sum of consumption flows:
max
e1,e2,G1,G2
V(e1, e2) = f (e1) −Ω(T1) − pie1 − Γ(G1)
+ρ[ f (e2) −Ω(T2) − pie2 − Γ(G2)],
Subject to:

Tt = Φ(Pt,Gt)
P2 = P1(1 − δ) + e1
G1,G2 ≥ 0
P1 > 0 given.
Because of the fixed cost, the objective function is
not continuous. Therefore, we cannot apply the Man-
gasarian Lemma: the first-order conditions are not suf-
ficient to have a maximum. Because of the discontinuity
 Ω
 Ω
 
 
pi
pi



 δ− 
 Ω+pi
Figure 1: Emissions are lower with the damage function
near Gt = 0, we will compare the solution given by the
resolution of the first-order conditions with the solution
for G1 = 0 and/or G2 = 0 (section 2.4). As both G1
and G2 should be positive, we form the Generalized La-
grangean:
max
e1,e2
L(e1, e2,G1,G2) =∑
t=1,2
ρt−1[ f (et) −Ω(Tt) − piet − Γ(Gt)]
+ λ[P2 − P1(1 − δ) − e1] + µ1G1 + µ2G2.
Because of the inequality constraints G1 ≥ 0 and
G2 ≥ 0, two complementary slackness conditions
should hold simultaneously:
µi ≥ 0 , Gi ≥ 0 and µiGi = 0 , i = 1, 2. (4)
The two slackness conditions imply four cases.
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CASE NN: G1 = G2 = 0. Geoengineering is never
used to counteract global warming, either because it is
too expensive or because the pollution stock is low. The
first-order conditions of the maximization program give
the optimal levels of emission and geoengineering:
⇔

eNN =
α − pi − 2ρ[P1(1 − δ) − γ]
2(β + ρ)
= e∗ − ρ
e∗ + P1(1 − δ) − γ
β + ρ
eNN =
α − pi
2β
= e∗.
(5)
(6)
The marginal return of emissions at time t = 1 equals
its marginal cost pi plus the discounted value of the
marginal damage due to these emissions. Emissions in
t = 1 are positively related to the discount rate ρ, the dis-
sipation of CO2 δ and the optimal temperature γ. They
are negatively related to the energy price pi and the ini-
tial pollution stock P1. Abatement in the first period
is positive if emitting e∗ would induce a temperature in
t = 2 which is above the optimal temperature level γ,
that is, if emitting more than e∗ would increase climate
damages. As our framework is limited to two periods,
emissions at time t = 2 will always be equal to e∗ as
they do not induce damage in the future.
Slackness conditions imply that both µNN
1
and µNN
2
are strictly positive:

µNN1 = m − 2κ(P1 − γ) > 0
µNN2 =
2βκρ
β + ρ
[
m
2κ
− [P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
]
]
> 0.
The complementary slackness conditions are suffi-
cient conditions for geoengineering to be suboptimal.
However, these conditions are not necessary: if the fixed
cost of geoengineering is high, geoengineering may not
be implemented even if slackness conditions hold. For
sufficient conditions, we will need to compare the dis-
counted sum of consumption flows for the four cases
(section 2.4). By reversing the sign of the slackness
conditions, we obtain necessary conditions for geoengi-
neering to be optimal.
Graphically, the damage function and its marginal
counterpart are represented by the blue lines in figures
1 and 2. The optimal level of emission is determined
by the intersection between the marginal productivity
of energy (the green line in the upper-part) and the sum
of its marginal cost plus the marginal damages at time
t = 2 due to emissions at time t = 1 (the dotted blue line
in the upper-part). In figure 1, abatement is positive as
increasing emissions would increase climate damages.
In figure 2 abatement is negative: increasing emissions
would reduce climate damages.
 Ω
 Ω
 
 
pi
pi



 δ− 
 Ω+pi
Figure 2: Emissions are higher with the damage function
CASE GG: G1 > 0,G2 > 0. If geoengineering is
cheap and the initial pollution stock is high, geoengi-
neering is used in both periods to counteract climate
change.
The first-order conditions of the maximization pro-
gram give the optimal levels of emission and geoengi-
neering:

eGG1 = e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
eGG2 = e
∗
GGG1 =
1
κ
(
P1 − γ −
m
2κ
)
> 0
GGG2 =
1
κ
(
P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
−
m
2κ
)
> 0.
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It is worth noting that abatement in the first period
is positive even if geoengineering is used. Abatement is
positively related to the marginal cost of geoengineering
pi and to the discount rate ρ, and negatively related to
geoengineering efficiency κ. Slackness conditions im-
ply µ1 = µ2 = 0, G
GG
1
> 0 and GGG
2
> 0. Because of
the fixed cost of geoengineering, GGG
1
> 0 and GGG
2
> 0
are necessary, but not sufficient for geoengineering to
be optimal. Therefore, if GGG
1
< 0 or GGG
2
< 0, the case
GG is not optimal.
CASE NG: G1 = 0, G2 > 0. Geoengineering is only
used at time t = 2. In the first period, the pollution stock
is low and geoengineering is not optimal. Emissions at
time t = 1 rise the pollution stock such that geoengi-
neering becomes optimal at time t = 2. The first-order
conditions of the maximization program give the opti-
mal levels of emission and geoengineering:

eNG1 = e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
eNG2 = e
∗
GNG1 = 0
GNG2 =
1
κ
(
P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
−
m
2κ
)
> 0.
Again, abatement is positive in the first period even if
emissions will be compensated by geoengineering in the
second period. The complementary slackness condition
at time t = 1 imposes µNG
1
> 0 (necessary condition),
that is: µNG
1
= m − 2κ(P1 − γ) > 0. At time t = 2,
the slackness condition requires GNG
2
> 0. Therefore, if
µNG
1
< 0 or GNG
2
< 0, the case NG is not optimal.
CASE GN: G1 > 0, G2 = 0. Geoengineering is only
used at time t = 1. In the first period, the pollution
stock is high and geoengineering is optimal. Emissions
at time t = 1 are low and the dissipation rate of CO2
is high. Consequently, the pollution stock sharply de-
creases, and geoengineering is not optimal anymore in
the second period. This case is of course not realistic, at
least in the short-run. The first-order conditions of the
maximization program give the optimal levels of emis-
sion and geoengineering:

eGN1 = e
∗
− ρ
e∗ + P1(1 − δ) − γ
β + ρ
eGN2 =
α − pi
2β
GGN1 =
1
κ
(
P1 − γ −
m
2κ
)
GGN2 = 0.
Abatement in period 1 is high as the country antic-
ipates that geoengineering will not be used in the sec-
ond period. The two slackness necessary conditions are
GGN
1
> 0 and µGN
2
=
2βκρ
β+ρ
[
m
2κ
−[P1(1−δ)−γ+e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
]
]
>
0. If one of these two conditions are not satisfied, the
case NG is not optimal.
2.4. The optimal case
Until now, we computed the optimal levels of emis-
sion and geoengineering for each case. We still have
to compare the discounted sum of consumption flows
for each case, taking into account that the country has
to pay a fixed cost to undertake geoengineering. Let us
compare the four cases by plugging the optimal emis-
sion and geoengineering levels obtained for each case
into V(e1, e2,G1,G2). We find the following results.
Proposition 2.1. Geoengineering at time 1 is optimal if
the two following conditions are satisfied:

p <
[
P1 − γ −
m
2κ
]2
P1 − γ >
m
2κ
.
(7)
(8)
Proof Simple algebra gives VGG − VNG = VGN − VNN .
Inequality (7) is derived from the following equiva-
lences:
VGG > VNG ⇔ VGN > VNN ⇔ p <
[
P1 − γ −
m
2κ
]2
.
The inequality (8) is derived from the complementary
slackness conditions: µNN
1
< 0 and µNG
1
< 0 are neces-
sary conditions for geoengineering to be optimal in the
first period. 
Taken together, conditions (7) and (8) imply that geo-
engineering is optimal at time t = 1 if the temperature
in the first period, P1 − γ would be high without the use
of geoengineering, and if the price of geoengineering
for a one-unit reduction in the temperature, m
κ
, is low
compared to the fixed cost of geoengineering p.
Proposition 2.2. Geoengineering at time 2 is optimal if
the two following conditions are satisfied:

β
β + ρ
[
P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
−
m
2κ
]2
> p
P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
>
m
2κ
.
(9)
(10)
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Proof The proof is similar. Simple algebra gives VGG −
VGN = VNG − VNN . Inequality (7) is derived from the
following equivalences:
VGG > VGN ⇔ VNG > VNN ⇔ Inequality (9) holds.
The condition (10) is derived from the complemen-
tary slackness conditions: µNN
2
< 0 and µGN
2
< 0 are
necessary conditions for geoengineering to be optimal
in the second period. 
As eGG
1
= eNG
1
= e∗ − mρ/2βκ, proposition 2.2 may
be interpreted as follows. Conditions (9) and (10) im-
ply that geoengineering is optimal at time t = 2 if the
temperature at time t = 2 without using geoengineer-
ing would be high and if the price of geoengineering
for a one-unit reduction in the temperature, m
κ
, is low
compared to the fixed cost of geoengineering p. Strong
preferences for the present (low ρ) increase the relative
utility of geoengineering use at time t = 2.
These propositions should be contrasted with the re-
sults of Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010). In the
present model, inequalities (7) and (9) induce that geo-
engineering may not be implemented even if the GHG
stock generates climate damages. In Moreno-Cruz and
Smulders (2010), geoengineering is always used in the
presence of climate damages as the fixed cost is not con-
sidered.
Everything else being equal, we derive from these
propositions that the initial concentration of GHGs in
the atmosphere is higher when geoengineering is im-
plemented.
Corollary 2.3. Geoengineering is implemented in the
short-run if the initial concentration of GHGs is high:
PGG1 > P
GN
1 > P
NN
1 . (11)
Similarly, geoengineering is implemented in the long-
run if the initial concentration of GHGs is high and if
the dissipation of GHGs is low:
PGG1 > P
NG
1 > P
NN
1 . (12)
In the present analysis of the optimal case, I assumed
that the fixed cost is paid each time geoengineering is
used. Under this assumption, the fixed cost encom-
passes investments needed to maintain geoengineering
capacities as well as indirect costs related to governance
issues or conflict mitigation. If we assume that the fixed
cost is paid only once, for example if the fixed cost
is related to R&D investments needed to develop geo-
engineering techniques, then inequalities (7) and (9) are
slightly modified for the case GG (the right-hand side
of inequalities (7) and (9) is divided by (1+ ρ)). Indeed,
as the fixed cost is paid only once, using geoengineer-
ing in both periods becomes more attractive. The case
GN becomes even irrelevant if GGG
2
is positive. This is
always the case when the GHG stock is high enough to
generate climate damages.
2.5. Comparing abatement, geoengineering and tem-
perature
Let us first compare the abatement levels across the
four cases. Regarding the level of emission in the first
period, we have that:
eNN1 − e
NG
1 =
ρ
β + ρ
[
m
2κ
− [P1(1 − δ) − γ + e
∗
−
mρ
2βκ
]
]
=
µNN
2
2βκ
.
As µNN
2
< 0 is a necessary condition for geoengineer-
ing to be optimal in the second period, we conclude that
emissions in the first period are higher when geoengi-
neering is used to compensate the global warming in the
second period. Furthermore, as PGN
1
> PNN
1
(corollary
2.3), and as emissions are negatively related to the ini-
tial pollution stock for cases GN and NN, we conclude
that the following relations hold: eGG
1
= eNG
1
> eNN
1
and
eNN
1
> eGN
1
. Hence, the country increases its emissions
at time t = 1 if it is anticipated that emissions will be
compensated by the use of geoengineering in period 2.
Conversely, the country reduces its emissions in the first
period if geoengineering is not expected to be imple-
mented in the second period. The following proposition
summarizes this reasoning.
Proposition 2.4. Abatement is reduced in the first pe-
riod if the country anticipates that geoengineering will
be used in the second period.
This proposition confirms a fear which is common
among opponents of geoengineering R&D. They argue
that promoting research to develop these artificial tech-
niques may give the false impression that environmental
issues are resolved, and therefore discourage efforts to
reduce emissions.
Regarding the level of emission in the second period,
it is straightforward that: eGG
2
= eNG
2
= eNN
2
= eGN
2
. This
set of equalities should be interpreted as an “end of life”
effect: emissions at time 2 have no impact on damages
as our model is limited to two periods. The long-run
evolution of abatement is discussed in section 3.
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Second, let us analyze the use of geoengineering over
time. When geoengineering is optimal at time t, it is
straightforward to see that the amount of geoengineer-
ing used is a linear function of the pollution stock:
Gt =
1
κ
(Pt − γ −
m
2κ
). (13)
As the 1/κ is positive, we have the following property.
Proposition 2.5. If geoengineering is optimal, the use
of geoengineering increases as long as the pollution
stock grows, that is, as long as emissions et are higher
than the dissipation of the pollution stock δPt.
Finally, let us assess the impact of geoengineering
availability on temperature. For a given initial pol-
lution stock P1, it is direct to see that the climate is
colder in the first period when geoengineering is used
as T1 = P1 − κG1. In the second period, the availability
of geoengineering affects the temperature in two oppo-
site directions. On the one hand, the direct effect of
geoengineering is to decrease the temperature. On the
other hand, the pollution stock is higher as abatement
is reduced in the first period (proposition 2.4). For a
given GHGs initial stock P1, we have that: T
GG
2
−T NN
2
=
T NG
2
− T NN
2
= µNN
2
/2κρ. As µNN
2
< 0 is a necessary con-
dition for geoengineering to be used, we conclude that
the net impact of the two opposite effects on tempera-
ture is negative. The following proposition summarizes
this statement.
Proposition 2.6. Even if the availability of geoengi-
neering reduces abatement, the temperature is lower
when geoengineering is used.
By plugging equation (13) into equation (2), we find
that the temperature with geoengineering is constant
and equal to:
TGeoss = γ +
m
2κ
(14)
This constant temperature is positively related to the
optimal temperature, γ, and to the marginal cost of geo-
engineering, m. Conversely, this temperature is lower
when geoengineering is highly effective, that is, if κ is
high.
2.6. Graphical solution
The damage function and its marginal counterpart are
represented by the blue lines in figures 3 and 4. Without
geoengineering, the optimal level of emission is deter-
mined by the intersection between the marginal produc-
tivity of energy (the green line in the upper-part) and
the sum of the marginal cost of energy and the sec-
ond period marginal damages induced by emissions at
time t = 1 (the dotted blue line in the upper-part). The
amount available for consumption is equal to the blue
area A. The brown area B represents the loss due to cli-
mate damages.
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Figure 3: Potential gain from geoengineering
In figure 4, the fixed cost of geoengineering is rep-
resented by the area in red. The hatched red area is its
variable cost: for a marginal increase of geoengineering,
the marginal damages curve moves to the right such that
climate damages decrease. Each unit of geoengineer-
ing costs m. The country will increase its use of geo-
engineering as long as the avoided damages are higher
than the variable cost m. It is worth noting that first pe-
riod abatement is reduced as climate damages are lower
(proposition 2.4).
Finally, the country will implement geoengineering
if and only if the brown area A in figure 3 is bigger
than the brown area A’+A” in figure 4, or, similarly, if
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the brown area A” is bigger than the red area p. This
condition is the graphical equivalent of inequality (9).
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Figure 4: Optimal geoengineering
3. Discussion: A long-term scenario
Even without an infinite-horizon model, a realistic
analysis of the long-term use of abatement and geo-
engineering is possible thanks to the 2-periods model.
Figure 5 represents the long-run evolution of emissions,
pollution stock, geoengineering and temperature, de-
pending on whether the country undertakes geoengi-
neering (plain lines) or not (dotted lines). If the initial
GHG stock is low (i.e. at the preindustrial level), con-
ditions (7) to (10) are not satisfied and geoengineering
is not implemented. Emissions are high because future
damages due to current emissions are low. Abatement
may even be negative if the initial stock of pollution
is such that the initial temperature is below its optimal
level γ. The pollution stock increases over time. Con-
sequently, emissions diminish because their impact on
damages becomes more and more harmful.
If geoengineering is cheap, geoengineering becomes
optimal when the pollution stock exceeds a certain
threshold. Because the country anticipates the im-
plementation of geoengineering, emissions will be in-
creased even before the threshold is reached (proposi-
tion 2.4). Hence, the long-term level of emission and the
long-term stock of pollution will be higher when geo-
engineering is undertaken. However, the temperature is
lower when geoengineering is used, even if abatement
is reduced (proposition 2.6).
Because of the fixed cost (accounted for in inequal-
ities (7) to (10)), geoengineering is not always imple-
mented, even if the GHG stock generates climate dam-
ages. When the pollution stock and the climate dam-
ages are high enough, geoengineering will be suddenly
used in large quantities. Indeed, by plugging equa-
tion (13) into a generalized formula for inequalities (7)
and (9), we have 0 < p ≤ κ2G2t . Consequently, the
temperature jumps abruptly from a high level to a low
level, which may disrupt sensible climate equilibrium
or fragile ecosystems. Once geoengineering is imple-
mented, the temperature remains constant at a level
slightly above the optimal temperature γ (taking into
account that the variable price of geoengineering, m, is
low). Emissions remain constant, and geoengineering
increases proportionally to the pollution stock so as to
maintain the temperature constant. Abatement is also
constant, and positive.
This long-term analysis should be contrasted with the
results of Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010). As there
is no fixed cost in their model, geoengineering is al-
ways used in presence of climate damages. Moreover,
as geoengineering may be used in very small quanti-
ties, Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) would not be
able to find a jump in geoengineering and temperature.
However, this jump is important to characterize as rapid
changes may have dramatic effects if the environment
and ecosystems are not able to adapt as fast.
Our long-run analysis also underlines disconcerting
intergenerational issues. Indeed, while current gen-
erations will anticipate the use geoengineering by in-
creasing their emissions, future generations will have
to reduce their emissions, to bear the cost of sustaining
geoengineering and will suffer from its negative side-
effects. If emissions are not mitigated, future genera-
tions may even not have the choice to use geoengineer-
ing, especially in presence of “tipping points”. Further-
more, geoengineering will have to be sustained for cen-
turies in order to avoid dramatic consequences induced
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by a sharp increase in temperature (Goes et al., 2009).
Hence, the forthcoming availability of geoengineering
methods increases the intergenerational negative trans-
fer from now to the future. This is particularly objec-
tionable as current generations from developed coun-
tries already live beyond the means of Earth system.
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Figure 5: Long-run scenario: emissions, temperature, pollution stock
and geoengineering
4. Conclusion
Geoengineering is troubling. Indeed, while it is ex-
pected to have a high cost-effectiveness at preventing
damages from global warming, it will nevertheless gen-
erate worrying side-effects. For example, the two most
popular SRM methods, clouds albedo enhancement and
sulfate aerosols injections are expected to have non-
uniform effects, and to induce significant regional cli-
mate changes. Furthermore, Stratospheric sulfate in-
jection may have adverse consequences on stratospheric
ozone and biological productivity, and cloud albedo en-
hancement will affect weather patterns and ocean cur-
rents.
In this paper, I showed that geoengineering availabil-
ity will also induce indirect side-effects, both in the
short- and the long-run. Using a two-period dynamic
model with climate change, in which geoengineering
may be used as an alterative to abatement, I deduced
the conditions under which geoengineering is under-
taken. I confirmed the fear of geoengineering oppo-
nents who argue that the anticipation of geoengineering
availability will dangerously decrease abatement in the
short, and in the long-run. Furthermore, I showed that
the optimal path of geoengineering use is characterized
by a jump, which will in turn induce a sharp and sud-
den decrease in temperature. This abrupt temperature
drop may prove to be particularly damaging for fragile
ecosystems and vulnerable regions. These indirect con-
sequences raise disturbing intergenerational issues. The
net benefit from geoengineering for current generations
is positive as they may increase their emissions with-
out engaging in costly abatement. For future genera-
tions, the situation appears to be much worse: as they in-
herit a higher stock of pollution, they may be compelled
to implement geoengineering in order to prevent catas-
trophic climate damages and to avoid reaching “tipping
points”. Consequently, future generation will have to
support the negative side-effects of geoengineering, as
well as to bear the full cost of geoengineering, which
includes R&D investments as well as the capacities re-
quired for maintaining high levels of geoengineering for
centuries.
These conclusions underline the need of an urgent re-
search agenda paired with large-scale experiments of
promising geoengineering methods, in order to assess
the effectiveness and the dangerousness of each meth-
ods, and to share more equally the whole cost of geo-
engineering across generations.
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